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Abstract
We investigated whether readers with high-functioning autism or Asperger’s
syndrome (HA/AS) di¤er from normal controls with respect to pragmatic
aspects of negation processing. We presented short stories to two groups of
readers, a group of individuals diagnosed with HA/AS and a group of nor-
mal controls. The ﬁnal sentence of each story either a‰rmed or negated a
particular proposition, which in the pragmatically felicitous context corre-
sponded to a highly plausible assumption for the situation at hand, but in
the pragmatically infelicitous context to an implausible assumption. In line
with our predictions, the group of healthy controls read the negative but not
the a‰rmative target sentences more slowly in the pragmatically infelici-
tous than in the pragmatically felicitous contexts. In the pragmatically fe-
licitous context, reading times for negative sentences were as fast as those
for a‰rmative sentences. In contrast, for the clinical group, the context had
no e¤ect: Reading times for the negative target sentences were longer than
those of the a‰rmative target sentences in both context versions. These re-
sults indicate that individuals with HA/AS indeed di¤er from normal con-
trols with respect to negation processing. Moreover, these results are in line
with the more general hypothesis that the di¤erences between normal indi-
viduals and those with HA/AS concern pragmatic aspects of language
processing.
1. Introduction
It is widely assumed that the contexts in which negative utterances occur
are rather limited (e.g., Halliday & Zoe 1993; but see Mehl and Penne-
baker, 2003 for the speciﬁcs of its prevalence). Typically, negative state-
ments are uttered when the negated proposition was either explicitly men-
tioned before by one of the discourse partners or at least constitutes a
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plausible assumption in the respective context (Clark & Clark 1977; Col-
ston 1999; Heinemann 1983; Schmidt 1973). Thus, negation is used to
communicate deviations from what was previously assumed or expected
(e.g., Givo´n 1978; for a di¤erent view, see Giora 2006). For the listener,
a negative sentence ‘‘not p’’ therefore not only communicates that p is
considered false by the speaker but also that the speaker thinks that the
listener may believe that p. Accordingly, when uttered in a context in
which the listener indeed believes p, or at least can understand why the
speaker may think so, the negation is pragmatically felicitous and should
be relatively easy to process. In contrast, when uttered in a context in
which the listener did not believe p, and cannot ﬁnd reasons why the
speaker may think so, then negating p is pragmatically infelicitous and
should lead to comprehension di‰culties. More speciﬁcally, in the latter
case, the listener must retroactively activate the assumption that the
speaker apparently wishes to correct before he or she can do any kind of
revision. In addition, the listener may be confused by the apparent mis-
match between his or her own beliefs and the beliefs that the speaker as-
cribes to him or her. Take for instance the sentence The children were not
wearing live vests when uttered in the context of a regular morning in a
children’s day-care centre. As there is no reason to expect the children to
wear life vests, the negative sentence will probably lead to processing dif-
ﬁculties on the part of the listener, despite the fact that it is most probably
true for the situation at hand (see Levine & Hagaman 2008, this issue).
The reason is that the listener didn’t expect the children to wear life vests
and cannot understand why the speaker may consider it possible that he/
she might do so. In contrast, the same sentence uttered in the context of
an airplane’s emergency landing, the sentence probably does not lead to
processing di‰culties. The hypothesis that the children were wearing life
vests is plausible for the situation at hand, and the listener therefore
should not be surprised that he or she is informed that this plausible as-
sumption does not hold for the particular situation at hand.
In line with these considerations past studies investigated the processing
of negation inside or outside of a pragmatically felicitous context. In
1965, Wason tested the context-dependency of negation processing with
respect to non-linguistic contexts. He presented participants pictures of
eight circles, seven in one color and one in another (e.g., circle 3). They
were then asked to complete a‰rmative or negative sentence fragments.
Negative fragments (e.g., Circle No 3 is not . . .) took longer to complete
than a‰rmative fragments (e.g., Circle No 3 is . . .), but this di¤erence was
signiﬁcantly smaller when the negative sentence referred to the circle with
the exceptional color than when it referred to one of the seven other
circles. Thus, participants seemed to proﬁt from an adequate context
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when processing negative sentences (but see Arroyo 1982, for some qual-
iﬁcations.) There are also studies that tested the context dependency of
negation processing with respect to linguistic contexts. For instance, Glen-
berg, Robertson, Jansen, & Johnson-Glenberg (1999), showed that the
processing of negative sentences can be facilitated when the prior context
highlights the attribute dimension that is referred to in the negated prop-
osition (e.g., color of the couch for The couch is not black). Similarly,
Lu¨dtke and Kaup (2006) demonstrated that the processing of a negative
sentence is signiﬁcantly facilitated when the negated proposition was
explicitly mentioned as a possibility in the prior context. No signiﬁcant
facilitation was observed for a‰rmative sentences, which suggests that
facilitation was stronger in the negative than in the a‰rmative conditions
and therefore allows ruling out a simple priming explanation of the re-
sults. In addition, Lu¨dtke and Kaup (2006) provided evidence that nega-
tion processing is also relatively easy when the linguistic context strongly
suggests the negated proposition. Under these circumstances negative sen-
tences require the same amount of processing time as their a‰rmative
counterparts. In contrast, when the context only weakly suggests the ne-
gated proposition, negative sentences require signiﬁcant more processing
time than their a‰rmative counterparts. Taken together, these ﬁndings
suggest that for normal readers negative sentences are relatively hard to
process when presented in a pragmatically infelicitous context, i.e., in a
context in which the negated proposition was neither particularly plausi-
ble nor previously uttered by one of the discourse partners. In contrast,
when presented in a felicitous context, processing of negation is facili-
tated, and in some cases even as easy as the processing of the correspond-
ing sentences without negation (e.g., Wason 1965; and Glenberg et al.
1999; Lu¨dtke & Kaup 2006, respectively).
What does this implicate with respect to negation processing in indi-
viduals with autism? Autism is a well know developmental disorder with
symptoms that start occurring in early childhood. One of the diagnostic
criteria for an autism disorder in current practice is a chronic impairment
in social relations (Baron-Cohen 1988; Fein, Pennigton, Markowitz,
Braverman, & Waterhouse 1986; Sodian 2005; Tager-Flusberg 1999).
Deﬁcits in the ability to participate in two-way reciprocal social interac-
tion persist throughout the whole lifespan of autistic individuals, indepen-
dent of the heaviness of their impairments along the autism spectrum
(Baron-Cohen 1988). For speaking autistic children and adults, this deﬁ-
cit is observable in the communicative use of language. Despite consider-
ate within-population variability, a characteristic pattern has begun to
emerge in the studies concerned with the communicative use of language
in individuals diagnosed with the autism disorder: Whereas for normal
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individuals, an essential motivation to communicate is a desire to share
intentions, thoughts and emotions with others, people with autism rarely
use language as a means of providing information to others that is new
to them or for obtaining information from others that is new to oneself
(Tager-Flusberg 1996). Although most reach adequate test results in lan-
guage tests that measure syntactic or semantic aspects of language pro-
cessing (Szatmari, Tu¤, Finlayson, & Bartolucci 1990; Tager-Flusberg
1985), individuals with high functioning autism and those diagnosed
with Asperger’s disorder (a mild form of the autism syndrome), usually
violate conversational rules of acceptability and politeness when using
language in social interaction (Baltaxe 1977; Tager-Flusberg 1981), and
more generally show deﬁcits in pragmatic aspects of language processing
in production as well as in comprehension (e.g., Kelley, Paul, Fein, &
Naigles 2006; Loukusa 2007; Norbury & Bishop 2002; Ozono¤ & Miller
1996; Ramberg, Ehlers, Nyde´n, Johansson, & Gillberg 1996). In compre-
hension, individuals with high functioning autism or Asperger’s syndrome
(HA/AS) exhibit problems especially in cases in which coming up with
an adequate interpretation requires taking into account the intentions of
the speaker (Dennis, Lazenby, & Lockyer 2001), reinterpreting the mean-
ing of an utterance (Ozono¤ & Miller 1996; Rumsey & Hanahan 1990)
or integrating information from di¤erent sources (e.g., Jolli¤e & Baron-
Cohen 1999a, 1999b, 2000; Noens & van Berckelaer-Onnes 2005; Nor-
bury & Bishop 2002). Accordingly, individuals with HA/AS have prob-
lems with understanding indirect requests (e.g., Ozono¤ & Miller 1996),
idioms (Kerbel & Grunwel 1998), metaphors (Happe´ 1993, 1995), jokes
(Emerich, Creaghead, Grether, Murray, & Grasha 2003; Ozono¤ &
Miller 1996), and irony (Happe´ 1993, 1995). They tend to interpret ut-
terances overly literal (e.g., Kaland, Møller-Nielsen, Callesen, Morten-
sen, Gottlieb, & Smith 2002) and show deﬁcits in establishing a locally
and globally coherent discourse representation (Jolli¤e & Baron-Cohen
2000).
Although researchers more or less agree that people with HA/AS have
di‰culties mainly with respect to pragmatic aspects of language, the un-
derlying causes are still a matter of debate. According to one very com-
monly suggested explanation, people with HA/AS are characterized by
a weak central coherence, with the result being that they attend to small
bits of information rather than to large, globally coherent patterns of in-
formation (Frith 1989; Frith & Happe´ 1994; Happe´ & Frith 2006). In the
non-verbal domain, weak central coherence can account for the superior
performance of people with HA/AS in the embedded-ﬁgures test (Jolli¤e
& Baron-Cohen 1997) and the block-design test (Shah & Frith 1993). The
pragmatic di‰culties in the verbal domain can also be accounted for:
424 Rebecca Schindele, Jana Lu¨dtke, and Barbara Kaup
Bereitgestellt von | Technische Universität Berlin
Angemeldet
Heruntergeladen am | 01.10.18 17:56
People with HA/AS tend to process each piece of information in isola-
tion without routinely taking into account contextual information, as for
instance the particular communicative situation or the intentions of their
discourse partners. As a result they interpret the utterances overly literal
and without an adequate understanding of the underlying speech acts.
Another commonly suggested explanation assumes that people with
HA/AS su¤er from a theory-of-mind deﬁcit (Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith
1985; Baron-Cohen, Tager-Flusberg & Cohen 2000).
According to this account, people with HA/AS have di‰culties in un-
derstanding other people’s mental states, especially acknowledging the
fact that the mental states of others may di¤er from their own mental
states (Baron-Cohen 1988; Sodian 2005). In the non-verbal domain, this
account can explain why individuals with HA/AS score relatively poorly
compared with a control group of healthy adults when presented with
tasks that require such an ability of mentalizing, like false-belief tests,
even if the groups are matched with regard to age and general intelligence
(e.g., Baron-Cohen 2000; Frith & Happe´ 1994). In a false belief-test, par-
ticipants need to attribute a false (and therefore di¤erent) belief to an-
other person (e.g., the chocolate is in the cupboard) and use this to pre-
dict the person’s behavior (e.g., she will look for the chocolate in the
cupboard) (Wimmer & Perner 1983). Normal children are typically able
to solve this kind of task from age 4 on. In contrast, autistic children of
normal intelligence often fail in this kind of test, indicating an impairment
in distinguishing their own beliefs from someone else’s beliefs (Baron-
Cohen 1993; Baron-Cohen et al. 1985). In the verbal domain, the
theory-of-mind-deﬁcit hypothesis is obviously well in line with the obser-
vation that people with HA/AS have special di‰culties in situations in
which coming up with an adequate interpretation of an utterance requires
taking into account the communicative situation and the intentions of the
speaker.
Let us now return to the question of what these considerations imply
with respect to negation processing in people with HA/AS. As we men-
tioned in detail above, there is evidence that normal readers interpret a
negative utterance as communicating not only information with respect
to the state of a¤airs under consideration but also with respect to what
the speaker thinks that the listener may consider a plausible alternative.
As a result, negative utterances are especially di‰cult to process in a con-
text in which the negated proposition does not correspond to a plausible
alternative. If individuals with HA/AS do not take into account contex-
tual information when interpreting an utterance (weak-central-coherence
account), or are unable to reason about the mental state of their dis-
course partner (theory-of-mind-deﬁcit account), then these individuals
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can be expected to di¤er greatly from normal controls with respect to
the processing of negation. More speciﬁcally, for people with HA/AS
it should be relatively irrelevant whether a negative sentence is uttered
in a context in which the negated proposition constitutes a plausible alter-
native (pragmatically felicitous context) or not (pragmatically infelicitous
context).
To illustrate, for a healthy individual, an utterance such as ‘‘The door
is not closed,’’ while communicating that the door is open (Kaup,
Lu¨dtke, Zwaan 2006), may further suggest that the speaker assumes that
the listener believes or suspect that the door is closed (Clark & Clark
1977; Givo`n 1978). If this is what the listener believes, or if the listener
at least understands why the speaker thinks that this is what he or she be-
lieves, then the sentence is relatively easy to process. If not, the sentence
should be relatively hard to process, be it because the comprehender real-
izes that the negation is not used as a means for correction or because the
comprehender is confused about the apparent mismatch between what he
or she considers plausible and what the speaker assumes that he or she
considers plausible. In contrast, for an individual with weak central co-
herence, the negative sentence is not related to the context in which it
occurs and it should therefore not matter whether the negated proposition
is plausible or implausible in the present context. Similarly, for an indi-
vidual with a theory-of-mind deﬁcit, an utterance such as ‘‘The door is
not closed’’ only communicates that the door is open but does not imply
any conclusions with respect to the mental state of the speaker. Thus, ac-
cording to both explanations of the autism disorder, the negative version
may or may not be harder to process than the corresponding a‰rmative
‘‘The door is open’’, but should not be particularly facilitated in case the
individual expected the door to be closed.
Based on these assumptions, we hypothesized that processing times for
negative sentences should not be inﬂuenced by whether or not the sen-
tences are presented in a pragmatically felicitous context for individuals
with HA/AS. In contrast, for healthy controls, processing times should
be faster in pragmatically felicitous than in pragmatically infelicitous con-
texts, as reported in previous empirical studies (e.g., Glenberg et al. 1999;
Lu¨dtke & Kaup 2006; Wason 1965). To test these hypotheses, we con-
structed short stories describing everyday events involving two characters
(e.g. two people getting ready for a walking tour). The descriptions were
such that they strongly implied a particular inference (e.g., that the pro-
tagonists were putting on special boots for walking). The ﬁnal sentence
of each story either conﬁrmed or disconﬁrmed this inference by means of
an a‰rmative or negative syntactic structure, respectively (e.g., She said
that she had / had not put on her hiking boots). In the negative version,
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the sentence denied a plausible assumption (i.e., the inference that was
presumably drawn when participants read the previous sentences). The
negation should therefore be pragmatically adequate, and accordingly,
the sentence should not be particularly hard to process, at least not for
healthy readers. Measuring this expected facilitation e¤ect due to a prag-
matically felicitous context, requires a control condition. We therefore
constructed a second version of each story. In this version, a slightly dif-
ferent event was being described, and importantly, the description did
not imply the proposition that was conﬁrmed or denied in the target
sentence of the story. For instance, instead of preparing for a walking
tour, the protagonists in the second version of the story were getting
ready to go out to a restaurant for dinner. As it is highly unlikely
that they are putting on their hiking boots for this occasion, the nega-
tive sentence that denies this proposition should be pragmatically infe-
licitous. Accordingly, the negated target sentence should be relatively
hard to process in this version, at least for normal readers who can be
expected to take the pragmatics of negation into account. It should be
noted that a‰rmative sentences are assumed to be much less context-
dependent (Wason 1965). Thus, whether or not the proposition that is
being conﬁrmed in the a‰rmative target sentence was implied by the
linguistic context should not matter as much for the a‰rmative versions
of the stories.
Taken together, for normal readers we expect to ﬁnd an interaction be-
tween the polarity of the target sentence and the context version of the
story: Whereas the context should not have much e¤ect on the processing
of the a‰rmative target sentences, negative target sentences should be
easier to process when the context implies the negated proposition than
when the context does not imply this proposition. In contrast, for readers
with HA/AS, who supposedly are insensitive to the pragmatics of nega-
tion, the processing of negative sentences should be relatively context-
independent as well. In predicting that HA/AS readers do not exhibit a
context-dependency when processing the negative target sentences we de-
liberately leave open whether they will have general di‰culties with nega-
tion or no di‰culties at all. In principle it seems possible that readers with
HA/AS have di‰culties with negative sentences for reasons other than
pragmatic adequateness. In this case, we expect to ﬁnd a signiﬁcant polar-
ity e¤ect of comparable magnitude in both context versions because read-
ers with HA/AS should not proﬁt from a pragmatically felicitous context.
Alternatively, negative sentence may pose no special processing di‰cul-
ties for individuals with HA/AS. In this case, we expect to ﬁnd no po-
larity e¤ect in neither of the context versions because HA/AS readers
should not su¤er from a pragmatically inadequate context.
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2. Experiment
2.1. Method
2.1.1. Participants. In the clinical group we combined the two diagno-
ses of high functioning autism and Asperger’s disorder. The clinical group
consisted of 19 participants. Fifteen of them were juvenile trainees of the
Vocational Training Center at Oberlin House in Potsdam, Germany, di-
agnosed with Asperger’s disorder or High-functioning autism. They were
between 15 and 20 years old. The remaining four participants were adults
between 25 and 53 years of age, all diagnosed with Asperger’s disorder.
All diagnoses were made by local mental health professionals prior to the
experiment. All participants were native speakers of German, and partici-
pated in the experiment on a voluntary basis.
The control group consisted of 20 participants. Fifteen were students
at the University of Technology, Berlin, between 20 and 30 years of age.
The remaining ﬁve were pupils at several secondary schools. They were
between 17 and 18 years old. All control participants were native speak-
ers of German with no learning disability or other neurological disorder.
They participated for a reimbursement of 4 euro.
2.1.2. Materials. The materials consisted of 36 short German stories,
24 of which were used as experimental items, and 12 as ﬁller items. The
experimental items were constructed according to the following schema
(see Table 1): An introductory paragraph, which included between one
Table 1. Sample Text (Roughly translated from German to English)
Introduction Thomas and Conny are spending a weekend in the mountains in
order to relax from all the stress during the week.
Variation sentence
Relevant Inference Today they decided to go on a walking tour for which they are
currently getting dressed.
Other Inference This evening they decided to go to a nice restaurant for which they
are currently getting dressed.
Filler sentence Thomas wants to leave and is starting to get impatient. Finally,
Conny is ready to go.
Target Sentence
a‰rmative She tells Thomas that she put on her hiking boots.
negative She tells Thomas that she didn’t put on her hiking boots.
Question Are Thomas and Conny on a weekend trip? (Yes)
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and three sentences, speciﬁed the setting of the story and introduced the
main characters. The subsequent sentence described a particular event
that the main characters were involved in (e.g., getting dressed). This
‘‘variation sentence’’ was available in two versions that di¤ered only min-
imally with respect to the wording, but implied di¤erent inferences. For
instance, if someone is getting dressed to go walking, she is likely to put
on hiking boots (inference A). In contrast, if she is getting dressed to go
to a restaurant, possibilities are high that she is putting on a pair of ﬁner
shoes (inference B). Up to three ﬁller sentences followed the variation sen-
tence. These ﬁller sentences elaborated on the event described in the vari-
ation sentence and were the same in all versions. The subsequent ‘‘target
sentence’’ either a‰rmed or negated inference A. Thus, in version ‘‘infer-
ence A’’ the negative target sentence denied a plausible proposition,
whereas in version ‘‘inference B’’ it denied an implausible proposition.
Accordingly, version ‘‘inference A’’ should constitute a pragmatically
felicitous context for the negative target sentence, but version ‘‘inference
B’’ should constitute a pragmatically infelicitous context. For reasons
of readability, we will refer to the two context versions with the terms
‘‘relevant-inference’’ condition and ‘‘other-inference’’ condition in what
follows.
Twelve ﬁller stories of comparable lengths and topics as the experimen-
tal stories were constructed and served to obscure the manipulation. Six
of the ﬁller stories ended with a negative sentence, and the remaining six
ended with an a‰rmative sentence. For each of the ﬁller stories, and for
eight of the twenty-four experimental stories, simple comprehension ques-
tions were constructed. Half of these required a ‘‘yes’’-response, and the
other half a ‘‘no’’-response.
2.1.3. Design and procedure. The design and the procedure of the ex-
periment was the same for the two groups of participants (clinical and
control). All participants read all 24 experimental items intermixed with
all 12 ﬁller items. The 24 experimental items were assigned to four lists
that counterbalanced items and conditions. Each list contained 6 stories
in each of the four versions, and each participant saw one of these four
lists. Thus, we employed a 2(group: clinical vs. control) 2(polarity of
target sentence: a‰rmative vs. negative) 2(context: relevant inference
vs. other inference)  4(list) design with repeated measurement on the
variables ‘‘polarity’’ and ‘‘context’’.
Each participant saw 12 stories in the ‘‘relevant inference’’ version and
12 stories in the ‘‘other inference’’ version. Half of each of these ended
with an a‰rmative target sentence and the remaining half ended with a
negative target sentence. In addition, each participant saw 6 ﬁller stories
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ending with a negative sentence and 6 ﬁller stories ending with an a‰rma-
tive one. The order in which these stories were presented was random for
each participant.
Participants were tested individually. At the beginning of the experi-
mental session, the participants were presented with a written instruction
regarding the experimental procedure, and then practiced the procedure
in two practice trials. The stories were presented sentence-by-sentence,
self-paced by the participants pressing the space bar. Pressing the space-
bar after reading the ﬁnal sentence of a story elicited in 20 out of 36 trials
the presentation of the comprehension question which was written in a
di¤erent color than the stories proper. Participants responded to the com-
prehension question by pressing the ‘‘.’’- or ‘‘x’’-key (marked with ‘‘y’’
and ‘‘n’’, respectively). They received feedback on their answers. The ex-
perimental session lasted approximately 20 minutes.
2.2. Results and discussion
In the clinical group, the data of two participants were discarded because
they made mistakes on half of the experimental comprehension questions,
and their mean reading times deviated more than 1.5 standard deviations
from those of the remaining participants. Mean percentages of correct
responses to the comprehension questions in experimental items and
mean reading times of the target sentences were submitted to 2(group)
2(polarity of target sentence)  2(context) 4(list) analyses of variance
(ANOVAs) with repeated measurement on the factors ‘‘polarity’’ and
‘‘context’’, in both the by-participant analysis (F1) and the by-items anal-
ysis (F2).
2.2.1. Percentage correct. The mean percentages with which subjects
correctly responded to the comprehension questions of experimental
items in the di¤erent conditions are displayed in Table 2. The statistical
analyses revealed no main e¤ects of context or polarity (all Fs < 1), nor
an interaction of polarity and context (all Fs < 1). Most important, there
Table 2. Comprehension-Question Accuracy for Experimental Items (Mean Percentage
Correct)
Relevant inference condition Other inference condition
a‰rmative negative a‰rmative negative
Clinical group 82% 88% 88% 88%
Control group 85% 90% 90% 85%
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was no main e¤ect of group (F1;F2 < 1), nor any interactions between
group and the variables polarity, context, or context-by-polarity (all
Fs < 1). This indicates that the two groups did not di¤er with respect to
an overall, relatively coarse measure of comprehension accuracy. In line
with this interpretation, the two groups also did not di¤er in accuracy
with respect to the comprehension questions of the ﬁller stories in the
experiment: Participants in the control group answered 89% correct and
participants in the clinical group 90% (t1ð35Þ ¼ 0.3, p > .50; t2ð11Þ ¼
0:5, p > .50).
2.2.2. Reading times. Reading times longer than 20 000 ms were omit-
ted (N ¼ 4). In determining outliers within the remaining reading times,
we took di¤erences among the participants and the four versions into ac-
count. First, the reading times of each participant in each condition were
converted to z scores. Then reading times with a z score that deviated
more than standard deviations from the mean z score of the respective
participant in the respective condition were discarded, with depending
on the number of observations per condition, as suggested by Van Selst
and Jolicoeur (1994). As in our design there were six observations per
participant and condition, was set to 1.84. For the three cells with
only ﬁve observations (i.e., the cells where one response time was above
20 000 ms and therefore deleted) was set to 1.68. This procedure elimi-
nated less than 2.2% of the data in the clinical group and 4.6% of the data
in the control group. The means of the remaining reading times in the
four conditions are displayed in Figure 1.
The observed reading time pattern is quite clear. For the clinical group,
negative target sentences were read more slowly than a‰rmative target
sentences in both context versions. In contrast, for the control group, neg-
ative target sentences were read more slowly than a‰rmative target sen-
tences mainly in the other-inference condition. These di¤erences between
the two groups were not reﬂected in the overall ANOVA in which group
was a between-participant factor. However, the di¤erences were reﬂected
very nicely in the separate analyses conducted for the two groups. The
overall ANOVA produced a highly signiﬁcant main e¤ect of group, with
participants in the control group exhibiting faster reading times than the
participants in the clinical group (F1ð1; 29Þ ¼ 33.7, p < .001; F2ð1; 20Þ ¼
225:1, p < .001), and a highly signiﬁcant main e¤ect of polarity, with
faster reading times in the a‰rmative than in the negative conditions
(F1ð1; 29Þ ¼ 9.0, p < .01; F2ð1; 20Þ ¼ 16.5, p ¼ .001). There was no main
e¤ect of context (F1ð1; 29Þ ¼ 1.0, p ¼ .32; F2ð1; 20Þ ¼ 1.2, p ¼ .28), nor
a context-by-polarity interaction (F1ð1; 29Þ ¼ 1.2, p ¼ .28; F2ð1; 20Þ ¼
1.5, p ¼ .23). The group-by-context-by-polarity interaction was also not
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signiﬁcant (F1 < 1; F2ð1; 20Þ ¼ 1.6, p ¼ .23). According to the hypotheses,
we nevertheless conducted separate analyses for the two groups. For the
clinical group, there was a signiﬁcant main e¤ect of polarity (F1ð1; 13Þ ¼
4:7, p < .05, F2ð1; 20Þ ¼ 8.4, p < .01), but neither a main e¤ect of con-
text, nor a context-by-polarity interaction (all F s < 1). For the control
group, there was a main e¤ect of polarity which was marginally signiﬁ-
cant in the by-participants analysis and signiﬁcant in the by-items anal-
ysis (F1ð1; 16Þ ¼ 4.2, p ¼ .06, F2ð1; 20Þ ¼ 5.6, p < .05). In contrast to
the clinical group, there was also a polarity-by-context interaction, which
was signiﬁcant only in the by-items analysis, (F1ð1; 16Þ ¼ 2.4, p ¼ .14,
F2ð1; 20Þ ¼ 5.1, p < .05). The main e¤ect of context was not signiﬁcant
(F1ð1; 16Þ ¼ 1.9, p ¼ .18, F2ð1; 20Þ ¼ 1.7, p ¼ .21). Planned comparisons
conducted for the negative and a‰rmative target sentences in the con-
trol group conﬁrmed the predictions: Whereas the reading times for a‰r-
mative sentences were not a¤ected by the context (both t < j1j), negative
target sentences were read signiﬁcantly more slowly in context version
‘‘other inference’’ than they were in context version ‘‘relevant inference’’
(t1ð1; 19Þ ¼ 1.8, p < .05, one-tailed; t2ð1; 23Þ ¼ 1.7, p < .05, one-tailed).
This result ﬁts nicely with the hypothesis that participants in the control
group proﬁted from an adequate context when processing the negative
target sentences. The relevant-inference version, implying the negated
proposition, constitutes a felicitous context for a negative sentence, and
accordingly processing the negated target sentences in this version is
relatively easy. In contrast, the other-inference version, not implying the
Figure 1. Mean reading times of the target sentence as a function of sentence polarity and
context version. Error Bars represent the conﬁdence interval of 95%
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respective proposition, constitutes an infelicitous context, and accordingly
processing the negated target sentences in this version is relatively hard.
The fact that no context e¤ect obtained for the group of readers with
HA/AS is in line with the hypothesis that individuals with this disorder
di¤er from normal controls with regard to pragmatic aspects of negation
processing.
One could argue that the two groups did not only di¤er with respect to
the diagnosis of HA/As but also with respect to age and general intellec-
tual ability. In principle it seems possible that the di¤erent reading time
patterns observed in the two group do not reﬂect di¤erences between
healthy readers and readers with HA/AS but rather di¤erences between
younger and older readers or between readers with higher and lower intel-
lectual ability. To obtain more information with respect to this alternative
explanation, we conducted two post-hoc analyses. First, we repeated our
analyses with only those participants who were between 20 and 30 years
of age (N ¼ 12 for the control group; N ¼ 6 for the clinical group). Sec-
ond we repeated the analyses with only those participants who were en-
rolled as university students or already held a university degree (N ¼ 17
for the control group; N ¼ 4 for the clinical group). Thus, for these post-
hoc analyses, the two groups were similar as far as age and general intel-
lectual ability was concerned. However, it should be noted that we con-
sider these post-hoc analyses explorative at best because of the unequal
number of subjects in the two groups.
The mean reading times for the four di¤erent conditions for the two age
groups are displayed in Table 3. As can be seen, qualitatively the response
time pattern looks very similar to the pattern observed for the whole
group. The readers in the control group but not those in the clinical group
have prolonged reading times for negative target sentences speciﬁcally
Table 3. Mean Reading Times for two soup groups of the two groups as a function of Con-
text and Polarity (standard error of the mean in parentheses)
Relevant inference Other inference
A‰rmative
M (SE)
Negative
M (SE)
A‰rmative
M (SE)
Negative
M (SE)
Homogenous with respect to Age
Control group 2968 (283) 3180 (294) 3016 (272) 3917 (517)
Clinical group 5309 (627) 5493 (823) 5327 (778) 5453 (997)
Homogenous with respect to Intellectual Ability
Control group 2964 (230) 3108 (237) 3034 (209) 3744 (406)
Clinical group 4539 (392) 4618 (627) 4466 (696) 4573 (326)
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in the pragmatically infelicitous context. These observations were more
or less also reﬂected in the statistical analyses. An overall ANOVA pro-
duced a highly signiﬁcant main e¤ect of group (F1ð1; 11Þ ¼ 151.4, p <
:001; F2ð1; 19Þ ¼ 87.3, p < .001). There was a trend towards a main e¤ect
of polarity (F1ð1; 11Þ ¼ 2.0, p > .15; F2ð1; 19Þ ¼ 4.2, p ¼ .05). The main
e¤ect of context, the context-by-polarity interaction, and the three-way
interaction of group, context, and polarity were not signiﬁcant (context
F1ð1; 11Þ < 1; F2 < 1; polarity: F1ð1; 11Þ ¼ 2.0, p > .15; F2ð1; 19Þ ¼ 4.2,
p ¼ .05; context-by-polarity: F1ð1; 11Þ ¼ 1.3, p > .25; F2ð1; 19Þ ¼ 3.0,
p > .10; group-by-context-by-polarity: F1ð1; 11Þ < 1; F2 < 1). Separate
analyses for the control group showed a signiﬁcant main e¤ect of polarity
and a context-by-polarity interaction in the analyses by items (polarity:
F1ð1; 9Þ ¼ 4.9, p ¼ .06; F2ð1; 20Þ ¼ 8.1, p ¼ .01; context-by-polarity
F1ð1; 9Þ ¼ 2.0, p > .15; F2ð1; 20Þ ¼ 4.4, p < .05). The main e¤ect of con-
text was not signiﬁcant (F1ð1; 9Þ ¼ 2.7, p > .10; F2ð1; 20Þ ¼ 2.6, p > .10).
The separate analyses for the clinical group did not produce any signiﬁ-
cant e¤ects (all Fs < 1). Planned comparisons conducted for the control
group conﬁrmed that polarity only a¤ected the reading times in the prag-
matically infelicitous context, i.e., the other-inference version (relevant in-
ference: both jtjs < 1; other inference: t1ð12Þ ¼ 2.5, p < .05; t2ð23Þ ¼ 3.2,
p < .01), and context only a¤ected reading times for negative target sen-
tences (a‰rmative: both jtjs < 1); negative: t1ð16Þ ¼ 2.0, p < .05, one-
tailed; t2ð23Þ ¼ 1.8, p < .05, one-tailed).
Let us now turn to the analyses with a sample that is more homoge-
neous with respect to general intellectual ability. As mentioned above, in
these analyses we included all those participants who were enrolled as
university students or had completed a university degree.
The mean reading times in the four di¤erent conditions for the two
groups are displayed in Table 3. As can be seen, the participants in the
control group still show prolonged reading times speciﬁcally in the prag-
matically infelicitous context. In contrast, in the clinical group, reading
times for negative sentences in the pragmatically infelicitous context are
not speciﬁcally prolonged. Although we are only looking at those partic-
ipants who are comparable in general intellectual ability to the partici-
pants in the control group, the observed reading time pattern mimics the
pattern that was observed for the whole group of readers with HA/AS,
except that the increase in reading time in the negative contexts is much
smaller. Thus, the observed response time pattern does not provide any
indication that HA/AS readers with high intellectual ability di¤er from
those with low intellectual ability with respect to a context-dependency
of negation processing. Analyses of variance conducted with these sub-
group data even showed the predicted three way interaction of group,
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context and polarity (F1ð1; 14Þ ¼ 4.9, p < .05). There were no main
e¤ects of context or polarity, and no context-by-polarity interaction
(context: F1ð1; 14Þ ¼ 1.5, p > .20; polarity: F1 < 1; context-by-polarity:
F1 < 1), but of course a highly signiﬁcant main e¤ect of group (F1ð1; 14Þ
¼ 191, p < .01). In a separate analysis for the control group, a polarity-
by-context interaction was observed (F1ð1; 13Þ ¼ 4.6, p ¼ .05; F2ð1; 20Þ ¼
6:4, p < .05). The main e¤ect of polarity was signiﬁcant in the analysis
by items (F1ð1; 13Þ ¼ 2.9, p > .10; F2ð1; 20Þ ¼ 5.2, p < .05) but the main
e¤ect of context did not reach signiﬁcance in either of the analyses
(F1ð1; 13Þ ¼ 3.6, p ¼ .08; F2ð1; 20Þ ¼ 2.1, p > .15). The separate analysis
for the clinical group did not reveal any signiﬁcant e¤ects (all Fs < 1).
Planned comparisons conducted for the control group conﬁrmed that
polarity only a¤ected the reading times in the pragmatically infelicitous
context, i.e. the other-inference version (relevant inference: both jtjs < 1;
other inference: t1ð16Þ ¼ 2.5, p < .05; t2ð23Þ ¼ 3.0, p < .05), and context
only a¤ected reading times for negative target sentences (a‰rmative:
jt1j < 1; t2ð23Þ ¼ 1.1, p > .25; negative: t1ð16Þ ¼ 2.3, p < .05).
Thus, taken together, for the subgroup of readers with higher general
intellectual ability, the results correspond exactly to our predictions: For
healthy readers, but not for readers with HA/AS, negation processing
is facilitated in pragmatically felicitous contexts. Yet, because of the
small number of subjects in the clinical group, we do not want to over-
emphasize this result. At the very least however, these results seem prom-
ising for future studies in which high-intellectual-ability individuals with
and without a diagnosis of HA/AS are compared with regard to negation
processing.
3. General discussion
In the present paper we were concerned with the question of whether in-
dividuals with HA/AS di¤er from normal readers with respect to the
processing of negative sentences. In particular, we were interested in
whether individuals with HA/AS are sensitive to pragmatic aspects of ne-
gation. We investigated whether the context e¤ect of negation processing
that was observed in previous studies with normal readers would also be
observed with readers with HA/AS. We presented short stories to two
groups of readers, a group of individuals diagnosed with HA/AS, and a
group of normal controls. The ﬁnal sentence of each story either a‰rmed
or negated a particular proposition, which in the pragmatically felicitous
context corresponded to a highly plausible assumption for the situation
at hand, but in the pragmatically infelicitous context to an implausible
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assumption. We measured the reading times of the a‰rmative and nega-
tive target sentences. In line with our predictions, the group of healthy
controls read the negative but not the a‰rmative target sentences more
slowly in the pragmatically infelicitous than in the pragmatically felici-
tous contexts. In the pragmatically felicitous contexts, reading times for
negative sentences were as fast as those for a‰rmative sentences. In con-
trast, for the group of readers with HA/AS, the context had no e¤ect:
Reading times for the negative target sentences were longer than those of
the a‰rmative target sentences in both context versions. These results
suggest that individuals with HA/AS indeed di¤er from normal controls
with respect to negation processing. In particular, these results are in line
with the more general hypothesis that the di¤erences between normal in-
dividuals and those with HA/AS concern pragmatic aspects of negation
processing: Normal controls consider negation as a means of correcting
false assumptions. Thus, when processing a negative sentence, they relate
the sentence to the context in which it occurs, and as a result are sensitive
to whether or not the proposition that is being negated corresponds to a
plausible assumption for the situation at hand. If the negated proposition
corresponds to a plausible assumption, processing is relatively easy. If it
does not correspond to a plausible assumption, processing is di‰cult. The
reason may be that comprehenders realize that the negation is not used in
its typical function, namely as a means for correction. Alternatively, com-
prehenders may be confused about the apparent mismatch between what
they themselves consider plausible and what the speaker assumes that
they consider plausible. In contrast, for individuals with HA/AS, it ap-
parently does not make a di¤erence whether or not the negated proposi-
tion corresponds to a plausible assumption for the situation at hand.
There are several di¤erent possibilities for why this may be the case. An
explanation that ﬁts particularly well with the weak-central-coherence ac-
count of the HA/AS disorder (Frith 1989; Frith & Happe` 1994; Happe´ &
Frith 2006) is that people with this disorder do not routinely relate the
negative sentence to the context in which it occurs, or at least show deﬁ-
cits in deciding which contextual factors are relevant and which are not,
and as a result are not as sensitive to whether or not the negated prop-
osition corresponds to a plausible assumption for the situation at hand
as normal readers are. An alternative explanation is suggested by the
theory-of-mind-deﬁcit account (Baron-Cohen et al. 1985; 2000). Accord-
ing to this explanation, individuals with HA/AS do not draw any conclu-
sions from the negated utterance with respect to the speaker’s intention
or mental state. As a result, processing of the negated sentence is not
facilitated in case of a match between their own beliefs and those of
the speaker.
436 Rebecca Schindele, Jana Lu¨dtke, and Barbara Kaup
Bereitgestellt von | Technische Universität Berlin
Angemeldet
Heruntergeladen am | 01.10.18 17:56
Several other explanations are conceivable also, even though they do
not map as well onto the extant theoretical accounts of the autism dis-
order. First, individuals with HA/AS may simply not consider negation
as a means for correction. If so, a negative sentence such as The door is
not closed does not carry any additional information compared to the cor-
responding a‰rmative sentence with the same truth value (i.e., The door
is open). In this case there is no good reason to expect any comprehension
di‰culties in cases in which the negation is not used as a means for cor-
rection. It should be noted, however, that this explanation would still be
well in line with the more general hypothesis that individuals with HA/
AS di¤er from normal readers with respect to pragmatic aspects of nega-
tion processing. The same does not hold for the second additional expla-
nation: Possibly, individuals with HA/AS di¤er from normal controls in
that they do not enrich their discourse representation by elaborative infer-
ences, or at least not to the same extent. If so, then the two contexts
would not di¤er with respect to whether or not the negated proposition
was part of the discourse representation that was available at the point
in time at which the negative sentence was being processed. It might be
argued that in this case there is no good reason to expect that processing
of the negative sentence is more di‰cult in one or the other context.
However, we do not consider this a valid alternative explanation for sev-
eral reasons: First, there is evidence in the literature that individuals with
HA/AS do draw elaborative inferences during comprehension (e.g.,
Ozono¤ & Miller 1996). But more importantly, even with the normal
controls, we do not claim that the observed context e¤ect necessarily re-
ﬂects that comprehenders in all cases drew the respective inference when
processing the context. In cases in which they did not spontaneously draw
the inference, the negation in the target sentence probably retro-actively
triggered a process for determining whether the negated proposition cor-
responds to a plausible assumption in the present context. In the prag-
matically felicitous context, the negated state of a¤airs is likely according
to world knowledge, and accordingly, comprehenders are able to under-
stand why the speaker has used a negation to convey the respective infor-
mation. No further processing di‰culties should arise in this case. In
contrast, in the pragmatically infelicitous context, the negated state of
a¤airs is not likely according to world knowledge, and accordingly, com-
prehenders can be expected to continue being confused by the use of the
negation in the target sentence. Along these lines of reasoning, we would
expect that individuals with HA/AS also exhibit the context e¤ect, if the
only di¤erence between them and the normal controls concerns the num-
ber of elaborative inferences that they are drawing during comprehension.
The fact that no context e¤ect was observed clearly speaks against the
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idea that the amount of inferencing is the decisive variable for whether or
not a context e¤ect is being observed.
As we implicitly mentioned above, there are two slightly di¤erent rea-
sons for why negative sentences presented in pragmatically infelicitous
contexts may lead to processing di‰culties in normal readers. One possi-
bility is that comprehenders notice that they themselves do not consider
the negated proposition a plausible assumption in the present context,
and accordingly realize that the negation is not used in its typical func-
tion, namely as a means for correction. This deviation from what is ex-
pected may lead to prolonged processing times. Alternatively, increases
in processing time may reﬂect the fact that readers, when processing a ne-
gation, draw conclusions about the mental state of the speaker, namely
that the speaker believes that the hearer may consider the respective prop-
osition to be plausible. In case the comprehenders themselves do not con-
sider the assumption to be plausible, and cannot ﬁnd a reason why the
speaker may think they do, they are confused about the apparent mis-
match between their mental state and that of the speaker. This confusion
alone may lead to increases in processing time. To our knowledge, there
is not yet empirical evidence that allows a deﬁnite conclusion as to which
of the two explanations is correct (but see Bonnefon & Villejoubert 2007,
for evidence from a reasoning study that points toward the latter hypoth-
esis). Interestingly, the two theoretical accounts mentioned above di¤er
with respect to the conclusions that can be drawn from the results of the
present study with respect to this issue. According to the weak-central-
coherence account, readers with HA/AS do not show a context e¤ect
because they do not relate the negative sentence to the context in which
it occurs. Thus, this account is neutral with respect to the exact nature
of the reading time increases in infelicitous contexts in normal readers.
In contrast, according to the theory-of-mind-deﬁcit account, individuals
with HA/AS di¤er from normal readers mainly in that they do not
take into account the intentions of the speaker. Thus, the fact that
normal readers do show a context e¤ect when processing negative sen-
tences, but individuals with HA/AS do not, reﬂects the fact that nor-
mal readers do take into account the mental state of the speaker,
whereas individuals with HA/AS do not. Accordingly, the theory-of-
mind-deﬁcit explanation of the present results is more in line with the
hypothesis that the prolonged reading times in the infelicitous contexts
reﬂect the fact that readers notice a mismatch between what they them-
selves consider plausible and what the speaker apparently thinks that
they consider plausible. Future research is necessary to decide why ex-
actly the processing times for negative sentences are context-dependent
for normal readers, as well as which of the theoretical accounts best
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accounts for the observed di¤erences between normal readers and readers
with HA/AS.
The experiment reported in this article focused on di¤erences between
normal readers and readers with HA/AS with respect to context e¤ects in
negation processing. We assumed that normal readers would have greater
di‰culties with negation in contexts in which the negated proposition
does not constitute a plausible assumption. In contrast, for readers with
HA/AS we expected that the context would not a¤ect the di‰culty of ne-
gation processing. This hypothesis was indeed borne out by the data. We
deliberately left open whether readers with HA/AS would process nega-
tive sentences as easily as a‰rmative sentences, or whether they would
show general di‰culties with negation compared to a‰rmation. The rea-
son is that there are several possibilities why negative sentences may be
more di‰cult to process than a‰rmative sentences that go beyond the
pragmatic aspects of negation. Thus, even if pragmatic violations are not
an issue, negative sentences may still prose processing di‰culties, be it
because they are longer than a‰rmative sentences or syntactically more
complex, or because they are associated with an unpleasant connotation
(for an overview, see Wason 1972; Kaup, Zwaan, & Lu¨dtke 2007). The
fact that normal readers did not show a polarity e¤ect in the pragmati-
cally felicitous context may suggest that these factors do not play a signif-
icant role in negation processing for normal adults. In contrast, readers
with HA/AS did show a polarity e¤ect in both context conditions, and
this indicates that these non-pragmatic factors may play a stronger role
in negation processing for readers with HA/AS.
In this paper we were concerned with negation processing from the per-
spective of language comprehension. What can be hypothesized about the
production of negation in normal vs. autistic individuals? For normal in-
dividuals, negation should be frequently used in contexts in which a par-
ticular highly plausible assumption turns out to be false for the situation
at hand. After all, in a context in which a particular plausible assumption
needs to be corrected, negation should be considered the adequate linguis-
tic means for achieving this goal. In contrast, for individuals with HA/AS
who presumably are insensitive to the pragmatic aspects of negation one
may expect that negation is generally only rarely used, or that it is used
but not as a linguistic means for correction. There are several other func-
tions that negative sentences can fulﬁll in communication. For instance,
negation is useful in situations in which not enough information is avail-
able for using an a‰rmative expression (cf. Beltran, Orenes, & Santama-
ria, this issue) or as a means of mitigation, i.e., when a weakened asser-
tion is to be made (cf. Fraenkel & Schul this issue, Giora, Balaban, Fein,
& Alkabetz 2005; and Giora 2006, for a review). Furthermore, negation
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may be used for reasons of politeness (Giora et al. 2005) or for conveying
understatement and irony (Giora, Fein, Ganzi, Levi, & Sabah 2005). Ob-
viously, of these functions, only the ﬁrst two can be expected to be ob-
served in autistic individuals, as the latter two certainly require theory-
of-mind processes. As of yet there is not much empirical evidence on the
production of negation, in particular not with respect to individuals with
an autism disorder. The only relevant empirical evidence with respect
to the production of negation in normal vs. autistic individuals that we
are aware of comes from the developmental literature: Autistic children
seem to follow normal children’s pathway in the development of di¤erent
meanings of negation in language production, but are signiﬁcantly de-
layed. Normal children use negation for the disappearance, loss, or non-
existence of a referent very early on, then acquire negation as a means for
rejecting a request, and only after that begin to use negation for denying
the nature of a referent’s property (e.g. ‘‘the horse hasn’t got a saddle’’),
or a previously uttered assertion (e.g., ‘‘no, it is green.’’ after somebody
has stated that the object is blue) (cf. Bloom 1970; see also Watson 1979).
In contrast, autistic children rarely use negation as a means for denial,
even at later stages in the developmental process (Tager-Flusberg 1999;
see also Shapiro & Kapit 1978). These results suggest that children with
autism are delayed in acquiring the denial function of negation, if they
fully acquire it at all. This interpretation is in line with our hypotheses:
If autistic individuals never fully acquire the denial function of negation,
then it is of no surprise that they di¤er from normal controls with respect
to the pragmatic aspects of negation. The question arises why the denial
function of negation is not being fully acquired. One reason may be a
theory-of-mind deﬁcit. To deny the truth of another person’s statement
demands the idea that the other person may hold di¤erent beliefs. Future
studies are necessary to obtain more information on the production of ne-
gation in normal and autistic individuals.
4. Conclusion
Readers with HA/AS di¤er from normal readers with regard to negation
processing. Whereas normal readers are sensitive to whether or not the
negated proposition corresponds to a plausible assumption for the situa-
tion at hand, readers with HA/AS are not. More speciﬁcally, for normal
readers, processing times are prolonged for negative sentences relative to
a‰rmative sentences only if the proposition that is being negated corre-
sponds to an implausible assumption for the situation at hand. In contrast,
for readers with HA/AS processing times are prolonged for negative
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compared to a‰rmative sentences regardless of context. Thus, readers
with HA/AS di¤er from normal controls in that they do not proﬁt from
a pragmatically felicitous context when processing negative sentences.
Whether the di¤erences between the two groups of readers reﬂect the
fact that readers with HA/AS do not routinely relate the negative sen-
tence to the context in which it occurs (as assumed by the weak-central-
coherence account), or that individuals with HA/AS do not reason about
the mental state of the speaker (as assumed by the theory-of-mind-deﬁcit
account) cannot be determined on the basis of the present data. However,
what the results do indicate is that readers with HA/AS di¤er from nor-
mal readers mainly with respect to pragmatic aspects of language process-
ing: Whereas normal controls are sensitive to the pragmatics of negation,
readers with HA/AS are not. Negative sentences are di‰cult to process
for readers with HA/AS even if they are presented in a pragmatically fe-
licitous context.
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